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 
Abstract—In this paper, we propose a ranking based locality 
sensitive hashing inspired two-factor cancelable biometrics, 
dubbed “Index-of-Max” (IoM) hashing for biometric template 
protection. With externally generated random parameters, IoM 
hashing transforms a real-valued biometric feature vector into 
discrete index (max ranked) hashed code. We demonstrate two 
realizations from IoM hashing notion, namely Gaussian Random 
Projection based and Uniformly Random Permutation based 
hashing schemes. The discrete indices representation nature of 
IoM hashed codes enjoy several merits. Firstly, IoM hashing 
empowers strong concealment to the biometric information. This 
contributes to the solid ground of non-invertibility guarantee. 
Secondly, IoM hashing is insensitive to the features magnitude, 
hence is more robust against biometric features variation. 
Thirdly, the magnitude-independence trait of IoM hashing makes 
the hash codes being scale-invariant, which is critical for 
matching and feature alignment. The experimental results 
demonstrate favorable accuracy performance on benchmark 
FVC2002 and FVC2004 fingerprint databases. The analyses 
justify its resilience to the existing and newly introduced security 
and privacy attacks as well as satisfy the revocability and 
unlinkability criteria of cancelable biometrics. 
 
Index Terms— Fingerprint, cancelable template, Index-of-Max 
hashing, security and privacy 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ATELY, rapid proliferation of biometric applications 
leads to massive amount of biometric templates. Public 
worries about the security and privacy of the biometric 
templates if stolen or compromised. Such concerns are 
attributed to the strong binding of individuals and privacy, and 
further complicated by the fact that biometric traits are 
irrevocable. Given the above threats, a number of proposals 
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have been reported to protect the biometric templates. 
Generally, the proposals available in the literature can be 
broadly divided into two categories: feature transformation (or 
cancelable biometrics) and biometric cryptosystems (biometric 
encryption). Biometric cryptosystem serves the purpose of 
either securing the secret using biometric feature (key binding) 
or generating the secret directly from the biometric feature 
(key generation). On the other hand, cancelable biometrics [1] 
is truly meant for biometric template protection. It refers to the 
irreversible transform that can alter the biometric templates 
such that security and privacy of the templates can be assured. 
If a cancelable template is compromised, a new template can 
be re-generated from the same biometrics. 
The cancelable biometric schemes in the literature vary 
according to different biometric modalities. However, the 
operation of a general cancelable biometrics system is similar 
to the conventional biometric system where the system 
composes of sensor, feature extractor and matcher except the 
former includes a parameterized transformation function right 
after feature extractor, and the matching is done in the 
transformed domain, rather in the feature domain. The 
parameters can be the passwords or user-specific seeded 
(pseudo) random numbers. The transformation function can be 
either a many-to-one function (non-invertible transforms) or a 
blending mechanism (salting) to alter the biometric templates 
[2]. A block diagram for general cancelable biometrics system 
is depicted in Fig. 1.  
 
Fingerprint is probably the most widely used biometric trait 
and the fingerprint minutiae is deemed as a reliable and stable 
local feature for accurate verification and identification [3]. It 
was believed that fingerprint image reconstruction from its 
minutiae is infeasible, but was disproved otherwise by Feng & 
Jain [4]. It is indeed not secure to store the original minutiae as 
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Fig. 1: A block diagram for general cancelable biometric systems. 
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2 
a template. Yet, it is quite challenging to design a template 
protection scheme with the following criteria [5]. 
 Non-invertibility or Irreversibility: It should be 
computationally infeasible to derive the original biometric 
template from a single instance or multiple instances of 
protected templates with or without auxiliary data (helper 
data). This property prevents the privacy attacks such as 
inversion attack and Attack via Record Multiplicity 
(ARM). 
 Revocability or Renewability: A new instance of protected 
template can be revoked or re-issued when the old 
template is compromised. 
 Non-linkability or Unlinkability: It should be 
computationally difficult to differentiate two or more 
instances of the protected templates derived from the same 
biometric trait. It prevents the cross-matching across 
different applications, thus, preserves the privacy of 
individual. 
 Performance preservation. The accuracy performance of 
the protected templates should be preserved with respect to 
the before-transformed counterparts. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, literature 
is reviewed in Section II. In Section III, the motivations and 
contributions of the paper are highlighted. In Section IV, the 
relevant background knowledge is given. The IoM hashing is 
described in Section V. Next, the experimental results are 
given in Section VI, supported by the performance analysis. In 
Section VII, security, privacy and revocability analysis are 
drawn. Finally, conclusion is given in Section VIII. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the past decades, numerous template protection schemes 
have been proposed. Several decent and comprehensive 
review papers exist in this topic such as [2] [5] [6]. We direct 
the readers to explore the details from these review papers. 
In this paper, we focus on review 1) several state-of-the-arts 
fingerprint minutia-based cancelable template schemes since 
fingerprint modality is the subject of study in this paper; 2) a 
number of generic cancelable biometric schemes. By generic, 
we refer to the schemes that are applicable to other biometric 
modalities such as face and iris as IoM hashing is indeed a 
kind of generic cancelable biometric scheme. 
A. Minutiae-based Fingerprint Cancelable Template  
Yang & Busch [7] proposed a template protection method 
based on the fingerprint minutia vicinity. Given N minutiae 
{mi |i=1,…,N}, each minutia mi with the three nearest 
neighboring minutiae {ci1,ci2,ci3} together form a set of 
minutia vicinity Vi ={(mi,ci1,ci2,ci3)|i=1,…,N}. Each minutia 
vicinity comprises of 12 orientation vectors: mi→ci1, ci2→ci3, 
ci3→ci1, etc. The four coordinate pairs of Vi are then 
transformed based on the 5 (out of 12) randomly selected 
orientation vectors in the respective minutia vicinity. Next, the 
random offsets are added to each Vi in order to conceal the 
local topological relationship among the minutiae in the 
vicinity. The transformed minutiae are thus regarded as a 
protected minutia vicinity with stored random offsets. 
However, Simoens et al. [8] pointed out that the coordinates 
and orientations of minutiae in [7] could be revealed if both 
random offsets and orientation vectors are disclosed to an 
adversary. They also showed that the attack complexity is 
considerably low (e.g., only 2
17
 attempts are required when the 
random offsets table is known with reference to 2
120
 attempts 
when the random offsets table absent). Although Yang et al. 
[9] later proposed a dynamic random projection that was 
originally outlined in Teoh et al. [10], to alleviate this 
problem, dynamic random projection incurs substantially 
increased computation cost than that of random offsets used in 
[7]. 
Ferrara et al. [11] demonstrated a recovery algorithm to 
reveal the original minutiae from the minutia cylinder-code 
(MCC) descriptor, a state-of-the-art fingerprint descriptor 
proposed by Cappelli et al. [12]. A non-invertible scheme for 
MCC is hence proposed, namely protected minutia cylinder-
code (P-MCC). The P-MCC computes the mean vector ?̅? and 
k largest eigenvectors Φ𝑘 from the MCC descriptor during 
training. These parameters are used for Binary-KL projection, 
which can be viewed as a one-bit binarization process of the 
projected features. Nevertheless, the cancellability is not 
addressed in [11]. A two-factor protection scheme based on P-
MCC, namely 2P-MCC [13] is put forward to make the P-
MCC be cancelable. Yet, the specific design of the MCC and 
its variations for point set data limit the propagation to other 
popular biometric modalities such as face and iris. 
Multi-line Code (MLC) proposed by Wong et al. [14] is a 
minutia descriptor constructed based on the spatial distribution 
of the neighboring minutiae within a fixed radius. Firstly, a 
straight line is drawn following the direction of the reference 
minutiae and a number of overlapped circles with a pre-
defined radius can be constructed. Then the neighbor minutiae 
are separated into different bins according to their orientation. 
Compute the mean of the distances between the center of the 
circle and the included minutiae for each region. In the 
binarization stage, two methods are used viz 1-bit and k-bits 
binarization. 1-bit binarzation is implemented based on a 
threshold value while gray code is used in k-bits 
implementation. If a MLC is compromised, the adversary can 
only obtain the rotated version of minutia vector. The regions 
reconstructed from different minutia vectors are uncorrelated 
as the orientations of the reference minutiae are independent to 
each other. Thus, the MLC may reduce the effort of brute 
force attack but difficult to recover the minutiae set. 
Wang and Hu [15] proposed a blind system identification 
approach for biometric template protection. This is motivated 
by the fact that source signal cannot be recovered if the 
identifiability is dissatisfied in blind system identification. 
This approach exhibits decent accuracy performance 
preservation and the irreversibility of transformed template is 
justified theoretically and experimentally. However, the 
protected template against other major attacks (e.g. ARM) is 
unknown.  
B. Generic Cancelable Biometric Techniques 
A well-known instance of salting based generic cancelable 
biometrics scheme, namely Biohashing [16], is based on the 
user-specific random projection where the distance 
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3 
preservation is proven by the J–L lemma [17]. Briefly, a user-
specific orthonormal random matrix 𝑹 ∈ ℝ𝑛×𝑞 where 𝑞 ≤ 𝑛 is 
generated from a seeded pseudo-random number generator. 
The extracted feature vector  𝐱∈ ℝ𝑛 is then projected via 
y=R
T
x, and 𝑦𝑖 ∈ y is binarized based on a chosen threshold 
value τ such as: 𝑏𝑖 = 0, if 𝑦𝑖 < 𝜏, and 𝑏𝑖 = 1 otherwise, for i= 
1,…, q. In the event of template is compromised, a new 
template can be generated by issuing a new set of random 
vectors from the user-specific token. Biohashing works in 
various biometric traits such as fingerprint minutia [9], 
fingerprint texture [16], face [10], iris [18] etc. However, the 
non-invertibility of the Biohashing could be jeopardized if 
both y and R are revealed. This is because Biohash is 
essentially a quantized under-determined linear equation 
system, which could be solved partially via pseudo-inverse 
operation [10]. 
Another work on cancelable iris that follows the random 
projection notion is Pillai et al. [19]. In this work, Gabor 
features are first computed from the iris pattern of the user. 
Random projections are then applied separately on each iris 
sector and the resulting transformed vectors are concatenated 
to form a cancelable template. Notably, [19] also reveals that a 
given random matrix 𝑨 ∈ ℝ𝑛×𝑑 with 𝑛 ≪ 𝑑 drawn from a 
standard Gaussian leads to small restricted isometry 
constants δS with ‘overwhelming probability’ as far as 𝑛 =
O(𝑆 log(𝑑/𝑆)) [20], given the iris features 𝐱 has at most 𝑆 
non-zero components. After projection with 𝑨, the probability 
to reconstruct 𝐱 decreases if 𝑆 is large. More works that 
utilizing random projection can be found in [21] [22] [23]. 
Recently, another generic cancelable biometrics technique, 
namely Bloom filter has been introduced. The Bloom filter 
demonstrates a well adaptation to the popular biometric 
modalities such as iris [24], face [25] and fingerprint [26]. 
This technique is first reported for iris [24] as follows: the 
Bloom filter 𝑏 is a binary vector of length 𝑛. The Bloom filter 
is initialized with zeros and formed by adding elements '1' into 
it using 𝐾 independent hash function {ℎ𝑖 ∊  [0, 𝑛 − 1]|𝑖 =
1, … 𝐾}. Practically, instead of using 𝐾 independent hash 
functions, a binary-to-decimal mapping is proposed. The 
IrisCode with dimension 𝐻 × 𝑊 is first splited into 𝐾 blocks 
with size 𝑙 =
𝑊
𝐾
, where 𝑙 is the number of columns of each 
block. Each block 𝐵𝑖, 𝑖 ∊ [1, 𝐾] constitutes the formation of 
the bloom filter 𝑏𝑖. This can be done by adding element '1' to 
𝑏𝑖 based on the position that manifested by each column 
codeword 𝑥𝑗 ∊ {1,0}
𝑚 inside 𝐵𝑖, where 𝑗 ∊ [1, 𝑙] and 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤
𝐻. Same 𝑥𝑗  will be mapped to the same element in the bloom 
filter resulted a many-to-one mapping hence non-invertibility 
criterion is satisfied. To achieve cancellability, an application-
specific parameter 𝑇 is applied, just like other cancelable 
biometric schemes do. 
However, despite decent performance preservation, security 
and privacy of the Bloom filter based schemes remains 
unsolved. For instance, Hermans et al. [27] demonstrates a 
simple and effective attack scheme that matches two protected 
templates derived from the same IrisCode using different 
secret bit vectors, thus break the requirement of non-
linkability. Moreover, a security analysis also reveals that the 
false positive or key recovery can be accomplished with a low 
attack complexity of 2
25
 and 2
2
 to 2
8
 attempts respectively 
[27]. Bringer et al. [28] further analyzed the non-linkability of 
the protected templates generated from two different IrisCode 
of the same subject. They revealed when the key space is too 
small, a brute force attack would be succeeded while the 
accuracy performance declines if the key size is increased. 
Experiment confirms the vulnerability of irreversibility with 
block width of 16 or 32 in the Bloom filter scheme. 
III. MOTIVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
From the literature, we can observe the limitations of 
present cancelable biometric schemes such as: 
 Some of the afore-discussed “non-invertible transforms” 
are in fact susceptible to partial or full inversion (e.g., [1] 
[7] [16] [24]). For instance, many-to-one function applied 
in [1] degenerates to a linear function due to the improper 
parameters selection or when multiple protected templates 
are known to the adversary [15] [16]. 
 Some of the afore-discussed methods are weak to survive 
from the security and privacy attacks, e.g. ARM [15], 
false-accept attack (dictionary attack) [11]. 
 State-of-the-art fingerprint minutiae protection schemes 
(e.g. P-MCC [12], 2P-MCC [13]) limits the coverage to 
certain biometric feature/modality, i.e. point set data. 
 Trade-off between performance and non-invertibility. This 
is due to the contradiction while strict non-invertibility 
implies total loss of information is required after 
transformation, accuracy performance preservation is only 
possible when discriminative information of the original 
template is conserved [5]. 
 Accuracy performance discrepancy. Some of the salting 
based cancelable biometric approaches that utilize user- 
specific parameter such as Biohashing [16] suffer from the 
accuracy performance discrepancy under genuine-token 
and stolen-token scenarios [1]. It is often observed that 
genuine-token scenario yields a huge performance gain 
over stolen-token scenario, which imposes an unrealistic 
assumption where the token is to be secretly kept all the 
time. Therefore, any template protection scheme that 
requires independent parameters to achieve 
revocability/cancellability should be free from this issue 
[5]. 
With above justifications, we outline a generic salting based 
cancelable biometric scheme dubbed Index-of-Max (IoM) 
hashing. The IoM hashing is motivated from the Locality 
Sensitive Hashing (LSH) in information retrieval domain. As a 
special instance of LSH family, the IoM hashing enjoys the 
merits of strong theoretical and empirical guarantee of 
accuracy preservation after hashing. With its pure discrete 
indices (max ranked) representation nature that non-linearly 
transformed from the real-valued biometric features, the IoM 
hashing can strongly protect the biometric data from being 
inverted. In this paper, we demonstrate the application of IoM 
hashing in fixed length fingerprint vector derived from 
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4 
fingerprint minutiae [29]. 
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 
1) We devise a novel ranking based LSH inspired IoM 
hashing as a means of two-factor cancelable biometric 
construct. With externally generated random parameters, 
the IoM hashing strongly conceals the biometric features 
while satisfies the accuracy performance, revocability and 
renewability criteria. 
2) We put forward two realizations of the IoM hashing, 
namely, i.e. Gaussian Random Permutation (GRP)-based 
and Uniform Random Projection (URP)-based hashing 
schemes and justify their characteristics both qualitatively 
and quantitatively. The two realizations are also shown 
free from accuracy performance discrepancy problem. 
3) We rigorously analyze the security and privacy aspects of 
the IoM hashing in both qualitative and quantitative 
manners. The specific instances include non-invertibility 
and non-linkability analysis. Moreover, the existing major 
privacy and security attacks e.g. invertibility attack, brute 
force attack, false accept attack, ARM attacks against IoM 
hashing are highlighted. 
4) We introduce a new sophisticated attack for cancelable 
biometric schemes, namely birthday attack, which is more 
vulnerable than the false accept attack. 
IV. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we give a brief account for Locality 
Sensitive Hashing (LSH), in which our IoM hashing based 
upon. Besides that, we also present the “Winner Takes All” 
(WTA) hashing [30] and the “Random MaxOut Features” 
(RMF) [31] that have inspired us in devising URP-based and 
GRP-based IoM hashing, respectively. WTA hashing was 
meant for data retrieval while RMF is for data classification. 
The latter is indeed a spinoff from maxout network in machine 
learning. 
A. Locality Sensitive Hashing 
Locality sensitive hashing (LSH) is primarily used to reduce 
the dimensionality of high-dimensional data by hashing the 
input items so that similar items map to the same “buckets” 
with high probability where the number of buckets being 
much smaller than the input items. The chief objective of LSH 
is to maximize the probability of a “collision” for similar 
items. Formally, the LSH family H is defined as follows: 
Definition 1 [32]: A LSH is a probability distribution on a 
family H of hash functions h such that ℙℎ∈𝐻[ℎ(𝑋) = ℎ(𝑌)] =
𝑆(𝑋, 𝑌) where  𝑆 is a similarity function defined on the 
collection of object X and Y. 
The key ingredient of LSH is the hashing of object 
collection X and Y by means of multiple hash functions ℎ𝑖. 
The use of ℎ𝑖 enables decent approximation of the pair-wise 
distance of X and Y in terms of collision probability. LSH 
ensures that X and Y with high similarity renders higher 
probability of collision in the hashed domain; on the contrary, 
the data points far apart each other result a lower probability 
of hash collision. 
ℙℎ∈𝐻(ℎ𝑖(𝑋) = ℎ𝑖(𝑌)) ≤ 𝑃1 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑆(𝑋, 𝑌) < 𝑅1 
ℙℎ∈𝐻(ℎ𝑖(𝑋) = ℎ𝑖(𝑌)) ≥ 𝑃2 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑆(𝑋, 𝑌) > 𝑅2 
(1) 
Given that 𝑃2 > 𝑃1, while 𝑋, 𝑌 ∈  ℝ
𝑑, and 𝐻 =
{ℎ: ℝ𝑑 → 𝑈}, where U is a hashed metric space depending on 
the similarity function defined by S, 𝑖 refers to the number of 
hash functions ℎ. 
B. “Winner-Takes-All” Hashing 
The basic idea of WTA hashing [30] is to compute the 
ordinal embedding of an input data based on the partial order 
statistics. More specifically, the WTA is a non-linear 
transformation based on the implicit order rather than the 
absolute/numeric values of the input data, and therefore, offers 
a certain degree of resilience to numerical perturbation while 
giving a good indication of inherent similarity between the 
compared items [30]. The overall WTA hashing procedure can 
be summarized into five steps: 
1. Perform H random permutations on the input vector with 
dimension d,  𝐱 ϵ ℝ𝑑. 
2. Select the first k items of the permuted 𝐱. 
3. Choose the largest element within the k items. 
4. Record the corresponding index values in bits. 
5. Step 1 – step 4 is repeated m times, yielding in a hash code 
of length m, which can be compactly represented using 
m⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑘⌉ bits. 
C. “Random MaxOut Features” 
RMF proposed by Mroueh et al. [31] is a simple yet 
effective non-linear feature mapping that approximates the 
functions of interest. Let {𝐰𝑗
𝑖 ∈ ℝ𝑑 | 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑞} 
be the iid standard Gaussian random vector drawn from 
𝒩(0, 𝐼𝑑). For 𝐱 ∈ ℝ
𝑑, the RMF is defined as 𝜑𝑖(𝐱) =
max𝑗=1…𝑞 < 𝐰𝑗
𝑖 , 𝐱 > , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚. A collection of m RMF 
yields a RMF vector 𝛷(𝐱) =
1
√𝑚
[𝜑1(𝐱), … , 𝜑𝑚(𝐱)] ∈ ℝ
𝑚. 
V. METHODOLOGY 
The IoM hashing takes a fixed-length fingerprint vector 
(hereafter referred to as fingerprint vector) as input; thus we 
first give a brief description on fingerprint vector and then 
followed by the IoM hashing and its two realizations, i.e. 
Gaussian Random Projection (GRP) and Uniformly Random 
Permutation (URP). For quick reference, the notations are 
given in TABLE I:  
A. Globally ordered fixed-length fingerprint vector 
TABLE I 
NOMENCLATURE 
Notation(s) Description 
H Locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) family 
h LSH function ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
𝑆(𝑋, 𝑌) Similarity function defined on the collection of object X and Y 
𝐱 Fingerprint vector  𝐱 ∈  ℝ𝑑 
m 
Number of Gaussian random matrices (GRP-based IoM)/ 
Number of random permutation (URP-based IoM) 
q Number of Gaussian random projection vector 
p Order of Hadamard product 
k Window size (URP-based IoM hashing) 
 𝒕 
𝒕𝐺𝑅𝑃 - GRP-based hashed code,  
𝒕𝑈𝑅𝑃 - URP-based hashed code 
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As outline in [29], the construction of fingerprint vectors, 
consists of three main steps, i.e. minutiae descriptor 
extraction, kernel learning-based transformation and feature 
binarization. Since IoM hashing takes a real-valued vector as 
input, binarization is hence dropped. The procedure of 
generating fingerprint vectors is given as follows (MATLAB 
codes available at goo.gl/8EoLsp): 
1. Minutiae descriptor extraction, 𝛀: Minutia Cylinder-Code 
(MCC) [12] is used at this step. The MCC is meant to 
capture spatial and directional relation between the 
reference minutia 𝑚𝑟 = {𝑥𝑟 , 𝑦𝑟 , 𝜃𝑟} and the neighbor 
minutiae 𝑚𝑏 = {𝑥𝑖
𝑏 , 𝑦𝑖
𝑏 , 𝜃𝑖
𝑏|𝑖 = 1, … 𝑛𝑟 − 1}, where 𝑛𝑟 is 
the total number of minutiae within a fixed-radius r. 
2. Kernel matrix computation. Let 𝛀 = {𝛀𝑡(𝑖)|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑡} 
be a set of MCC training samples and 𝑁𝑡 denotes the total 
number of 𝛀𝑡. A kernel matrix 𝐊 ∈ ℝ𝑁𝑡×𝑁𝑡 is then 
computed with the kernel function given in eq. (2), where 
𝑆𝑀𝐶𝐶 ∈ [0,1] is the MCC dissimilarity measure and σ is the 
spread factor. 
                   𝐊(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑘(𝛀𝑡(𝑖), 𝛀𝑡(𝑗))
= exp (−(1 − 𝑆𝑀𝐶𝐶(𝑖, 𝑗))
2
/2𝜎2) 
(2) 
3. With K, the projection matrix 𝐏 ∈ ℝ𝑁𝑡×𝑑, i.e. the 
eigenvectors of the kernel principal component analysis 
(KPCA) [33] can be inferred, where 𝑑 denotes the number 
of desired output dimensions. 
4. Let 𝛀𝑞 be the MCC descriptor query instance. The 𝛀𝑞 is 
first matched with all training samples 𝛀𝑡(𝑖) for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤
𝑁𝑡. Subsequently, a vector v ∈ ℝ
𝑁𝑡  can be formed by 
concatenating the 𝑁𝑡 matching scores 𝑣𝑖 : 
𝑣𝑖 ← 𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝛀
𝑞 , 𝛀𝑡(𝑖)) (3) 
5. 𝐯 is then transformed with the kernel function in eq. (2) 
yields 
?̅? = exp (−(1 − 𝐯)2/2𝜎2) (4) 
6. A fingerprint vector x can be generated through: 
𝐱 = ?̅?𝐏 ∈ ℝ𝑑 (5) 
where ?̅? ∈ ℝ𝑁𝑡 and P∈ ℝ𝑁𝑡×𝑑. 
B. The IoM Hashing 
The IoM hashing is a means of cancelable biometrics that 
can be perceived as a special instance of LSH portray in 
Definition 1. The locality sensitive function ℎ(. ) in our 
context, refers to the q-dimension random projection in GRP-
based realization (section V(C)) and the 𝑝-order Hadamard 
product in URP-based IoM hashing (section V(D)), 
respectively. In general, the IoM hashing embeds the 
biometric features non-linearly onto a rank metric space that 
characterized by the LSH admitted ranking based similarity 
functions S. In this work, two different ranking based 
functions are identified for GRP and URP realizations (section 
V(E)). (MATLAB codes available at goo.gl/8EoLsp). 
As a LSH instance, the accuracy performance of biometric 
features can be preserved largely after IoM hashing. The pure 
discrete indices representation nature of the IoM hashed code 
enjoys several merits as follows: 
1. The IoM hashing empowers strong concealment to 
biometric information, which is always manifested in 
terms of feature magnitudes. This contributes to the solid 
ground of non-invertibility guarantee (refer section 
VII(A)). 
2. The IoM hashing is essentially a type of ranking based 
hashing method that relies on the relative ordering of 
feature dimensions, and thus independent to the magnitude 
of the features. This makes the hashed codes robust against 
noises and variations that would not affect the implicit 
ordering. In fact, the works based on the ranking notion are 
not uncommon in computer vision [34] and information 
retrieval domain [30] [35]. 
3. Magnitude-independence of the IoM hashing makes the 
resultant hash codes being scale-invariant, which is critical 
to compare and align the features from heterogeneous 
spaces [35]. 
C. Gaussian Random Projection (GRP)-based IoM hashing 
The GRP-based IoM hashing can be condensed into a two-
step procedure as follows: 
1. Given a fingerprint vector  𝐱 ∈  ℝ𝑑, generate q number of 
random Gaussian projection vectors for m times, {𝐰𝑗
𝑖 ∈
 ℝ𝑑 | 𝑖 = 1 … , 𝑚, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑞 } ~ 𝒩(0, 𝐼𝑑) and hence a 
random Gaussian projection matrix  𝐖𝒊 = [𝐰1
𝑖 , … 𝐰𝑞
𝑖 ] can 
be formed. 
2. Record the m indices of the maximum value computed from 
𝜑𝑖(𝐱) = arg max𝑗=1…𝑞〈𝐰𝑗
𝑖 , 𝐱〉 as 𝑡𝑖. The GRP-based IoM 
hashed code is hence 𝒕𝐺𝑅𝑃 = {𝑡𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑞]|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚}. 
Pseudo-code of the GRP-based IoM hashing is also given in 
Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1. Gaussian Random Projection based IoM hashing 
Input  Feature vector 𝐱 with 𝑑 dimensions, number of Gaussian 
random matrices m and the number of Gaussian random 
projection vector 𝑞 
Step 1: Generate m Gaussian random matrices 𝐖𝒊 = (𝐰1
𝑖 , … , 𝐰𝑞
𝑖 ) 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚. 
Step 2: Initialize ith hashed code 𝑡𝑖 = 0. 
Step 3: Perform random projection and record the maximum 
index in the projected feature vector. 
For k = 1: m 
         ?̅?𝑘 = 𝐖𝑘𝐱  
         Find 𝐱𝑗
𝑘 = max (?̅?𝑘), 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑞 
         Then 𝑡𝑖 = 𝑗 (𝑗 refers the index of ?̅?
𝑘) 
End for 
Output Hashed code 𝒕𝐺𝑅𝑃 = {𝑡𝑖|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚} and 𝒕𝐺𝑅𝑃 ∈ [1, 𝑞]. 
Note that GPR-based IoM hashing differs from the RMF in 
section IV(C) in such a way that the representation form of the 
former encodes the indices of the maximum value of 𝜑𝑖(𝐱), 
whereas the latter is mere the maximum numeric values of 
𝜑𝑖(𝐱). In a nutshell, the GRP embeds the fingerprint vector 
onto a q-dimension Gaussian random subspace and the index 
of max-valued projected feature is taken, which is equivalent 
to a hashed entry, h(·) in the rank space from LSH viewpoint. 
This process is repeated with m independent Gaussian random 
matrices and yield a collection of m IoM indices. Therefore, 
the GRP hashed codes enjoy the Euclidean pairwise distance 
preservation in the projected subspace ℝ𝑞. The LSH admitted 
distance/similarity function S is determined by the Lemma 1 in 
section V(E). 
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6 
Despite GRP-based IoM hashing and Biohashing [16] share 
a common ground where both adopt random projections, the 
distinctions of them are more apparent: 
1. The theory of GRP-based IoM hashing is based on the 
LSH that embeds any finite subset in Euclidian space to 
𝑂(𝜖−2𝑟) dimensions with 1 + 𝜖 distortion within the 
neighborhoods with at most r points [36]. While the 
Biohashing is stemmed from the J–L lemma [17], which 
embeds any n-points in Euclidian space to 𝑂(𝜖−2 log 𝑛) 
dimensions with 1 + 𝜖 distortion. In other words, the IoM 
hashing can be perceived as a local manifestation of J-L 
lemma [17], which works well for local distance 
preservation but not globally preserved as in the 
Biohashing scheme. Besides, accuracy performance of the 
Biohashing could be deteriorated in stolen-token scenario 
due to simplistic thresholding operation that endures 
information lost. This issue does not exist in the GRP-
based IoM hashing as no thresholding is used. 
2. Multiple (m to be exact) Gaussian projection matrices  𝐖𝒊 
(m independent hashing from LSH perspective) are used in 
the GRP-based IoM hashing whereas mere one single 
random orthogonal projection matrix is used in the 
Biohashing; 
3. The GRP-based IoM hashed code is a collection of 
independent discrete index values while Biohashing is a 
real-valued feature vector; 
4. The projection matrix in the Biohashing should be kept 
secret for maximal security and privacy protection; on the 
contrary projection matrices of the GRP-based IoM 
hashing is not necessary to be private, in which we will 
further justify in section VII. 
D. Uniformly Random Permutation (URP)-based IoM 
hashing 
The key ingredient of URP-based IoM hashing is the 
uniform random permutation that inherited from the WTA 
hashing and further strengthened by the Hadamard product 
operation. The overall transformation is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
Suppose a feature vector 𝐱 ∈ ℝ𝑑 and 𝑚 independent hash 
functions {ℎ𝑖(𝐱) ∈ [1, 𝑘]|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚} where each hash 
function consists of 𝑝-order Hadamard product. The URP-
based IoM hashed code is thus generated by concatenating the 
outputs from 𝑚 independent hash functions. The 5-steps 
procedure of the URP-based IoM hashing is as follows and its 
pseudo code is presented in Algorithm 2.  
1. Random Permutation: For each ℎ(𝐱), generate a 
permutation set 𝜃, which is generated from p independent 
random uniform permutation seeds. Then, 𝐱 is permuted 
yield p permuted vectors, {?̂?𝑗ϵℝ
𝑑|𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝}. 
2. Hadamard Product Vector Generation: Generate a 𝑝-
order Hadamard product vector by performing the 
element-wise multiplication on p permuted vectors i.e. 
 ?̅? = ∏ (?̂?𝑗) ∈ ℝ
𝑑𝑝
𝑗=1 . 
3. For each ?̅?, select the first 𝑘 elements where 1 < 𝑘 <d. 
4. Record the index of the maximum value in the first 𝑘 
elements (or k-size window for brevity) and the index 
value is stored as 𝑡 ∈ [1, 𝑘]. 
5. Repeat step 1 to 4 with different permutations set 
{ 𝜃(𝑙,𝑖)|𝑙 = 1, … , 𝑞, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚} and construct URP based 
Algorithm 2. Uniformly Random Permutation based IoM 
hashing 
Input Feature vector 𝐱, p order of Hadamard product, number of 
random permutation m, window size k 
For each permutation set { 𝜃(𝑙,𝑖)|𝑙 = 1, … , 𝑞, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚}  
Step 1: Permute elements in 𝐱 based on 𝜃(𝑖,𝑙), ?̂? = 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚(𝒙), 
perm(.) is the random permutation function 
Step 2: Initialize ith hashed code 𝑡𝑖 = 0 
Step 3: Hadamard product vector generation and output hashed 
codes 
For j=1: k 
        Set  ?̅?(𝑗) = ∏ (?̂?𝑙(𝑗))
𝑝
𝑙=1  
         if  ?̅?(𝑗) > ?̅?(𝑡𝑖) then 𝑡𝑖 = 𝑗 
End for 
Output Hashed code 𝒕𝑈𝑅𝑃 = {𝑡𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘]|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚} 
 
Fig. 2. Uniformly Random Permutation (URP) based IoM hashing where d=5, p=2 and k=3 are used as illustration.  
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7 
IoM hashed code, 𝒕𝑈𝑅𝑃 = {𝑡𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘]|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚}. 
Note that window size k has an impact in the distribution of 
which indices from the fingerprint vector end up in the code. 
The choice of k indeed leads to different emphasis on pair-
wise agreements for indices at the first k entries in the 
permuted vector. The value of k offers a way to tune for giving 
higher weight to top entry in the biometric vectors versus the 
others [30]. 
We highlight that 𝑝-order Hadamard product in the URP-
based realization is a crucial factor for security and privacy. 
Due to the k-windowed permutation is finite in principle, the 
adversary may launch brute force attack, dictionary attack or 
ARM (section VII(A) and VII(B)) to either gain illegal access 
to the system or to recover the biometric features. If both IoM 
hashed codes and permutation seeds are revealed, the attack 
complexity could be significantly reduced. The 𝑝-order 
Hadamard product can largely increases the difficulty of such 
recovery. We refer the readers to section VII(B)(2) for detail 
analysis. 
E. Matching of IoM Hashed Codes 
The IoM hashing essentially follows the ranking based LSH 
that strives to ensure that two fingerprint vectors with high 
similarity renders higher probability of collision in the rank 
domain; on the contrary, the vectors far apart each other result 
a lower probability of hash collision. Suppose two hashed 
codes, enrolled 𝒕𝑒 = {𝑡𝑖
𝑒|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚} and query 𝒕𝑞 = {𝑡𝑗
𝑞|𝑗 =
1, … , 𝑚 and 𝑆(𝒕𝑒 , 𝒕𝑞) represents the probability of collision of 
two hashed codes i.e. ℙ[𝑡𝑖
𝑒 = 𝑡𝑗
𝑞] = 𝑆(𝒕𝑒 , 𝒕𝑞) for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚. 
The high probability of collision implies high similarity of 
𝒕𝑒 , 𝒕𝑞 and vice-versa. 
It is important to note that despite both URP and GRP based 
IoM hashing encode the maximum values of the transformed 
features in indices representation, the respective rank 
similarity functions S(·,·) are fundamentally different. In what 
follows, we first give a lemma that enables us to establish the 
GRP-based IoM matcher. 
Lemma 1 [37]: For 𝐮, 𝐯 ∈ ℝ𝑑 be the unit vector ‖𝐮‖ =
‖𝐯‖ = 1 at angle 𝜃. Let 𝜌 = 𝐮 ∙ 𝐯 = cos 𝜃 and 𝐫1, … , 𝐫𝑞 be a 
sequences of iid standard Gaussian random vectors, the 
probability for 𝐮 and 𝐯 be not separated by 𝐫1, … , 𝐫𝑞is 
designated as 𝑘𝑞(𝐮, 𝐯). The Taylor series of 𝑘𝑞(𝐮, 𝐯) is given: 
𝑘𝑞(𝐮, 𝐯) = ∑ 𝑎𝑖(𝑞)𝜌𝑖
∞
𝑖=0
  (6) 
where 𝑘𝑞 around 𝜌 = 0, converges for all 𝜌 in the range of 
|𝜌| ≤ 1. The coefficients 𝑎𝑖(𝑞) are non-zero and their sum 
converges to 1. The first three coefficients can be expressed as 
𝑎0(𝑞) =
1
𝑞
, 𝑎1(𝑞) =
ℎ1
2(𝑞)
𝑞−1
, and 𝑎2(𝑞) =
𝑞ℎ2
2(𝑞)
(𝑞−1)(𝑞−2)
, where 
ℎ𝑖(𝑞) is the expectation of 𝜙𝑖(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) where 𝜙𝑖(∙) be the 
normalized Hermite polynomials and 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the maximum 
entry of q iid standard Gaussian random variables. 
Remark 1 [31]: Let ℎ : ℝ𝑑 → {1, … , 𝑞}𝑚 a hashing function 
that admits LSH, for 𝐮 and 𝐯 ∈ ℝ𝑑  and 
ℎ(𝐮)={arg max𝑗=1…𝑞〈𝐰𝑗
𝑖 , 𝐮〉 |𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚} where {𝐰𝑗 ∈
 ℝ𝑑|𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑞} ~ 𝒩(0, 𝐈𝑑) . The expectation of the 
probability that the identical entries appear in two hashed 
codes, can be estimated as 𝐄(ℙ[ℎ𝑖(𝐮) = ℎ𝑖(𝐯)]) =
ℙ{arg max𝑗=1…𝑞〈𝐰𝑗
𝑙 , 𝐮〉 = arg max𝑗=1…𝑞〈𝐰𝑗
𝑙 , 𝐯〉}. As 𝑚 
becomes large, 𝑘𝑞(𝐮, 𝐯) can be approximated by: 
ℙ {arg max
𝑗=1…𝑞
〈𝐰𝑗
𝑖 , 𝐮〉 =  arg max
𝑗=1…𝑞
〈𝐰𝑗
𝑖 , 𝐯〉}  ≈ 𝑘𝑞(𝐮, 𝐯) (7) 
𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑃(𝒕
𝑒 , 𝒕𝑞) = ℙ {arg max
𝑗=1…𝑞
〈𝐰𝑗
𝑖 , 𝐮〉 =  arg max
𝑗=1…𝑞
〈𝐰𝑗
𝑖 , 𝐯〉}  
≈ 𝑘𝑞(𝐮, 𝐯) 
(8) 
The matching of GRP-based realization hence can be 
carried out based on (8), which echoes the probability of 
collision of two hashed codes. Operationally, the matching 
score is mere a total number of collisions which can be sought 
by counting the number of ‘0’ (collisions) after the element-
wise subtraction of 𝒕𝑒 , 𝒕𝑞 over m (total entries of the hashed 
code). 
For URP-based IoM, the 𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃(·,·) is a rank correlation 
measurement. Briefly, the rank correlation refers to the 
measurement of ordinal association ordinal measure) that 
based on the relative ordering of values in a given range. The 
pairwise-order 𝑃𝑂, the simplest similarity measure for rank 
correlation is defined as [38]: 
𝑃𝑂(𝒕𝑒 , 𝒕𝑞) = ∑ ∑ 𝑄 ((𝑡𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑡𝑗
𝑒)(𝑡𝑖
𝑞 − 𝑡𝑗
𝑞))
𝑗<𝑖
𝑖
= ∑ 𝑅𝑖(𝒕
𝑒 , 𝒕𝑞)
𝑖
 
where 𝑅𝑖(𝒕
𝑒, 𝒕𝑞) = |𝐿(𝒕𝑒, 𝑖) ∩ 𝐿(𝒕𝑞 , 𝑖)| 
𝐿(𝒕𝑒 , 𝑖) = {𝑗|𝒕𝑒(𝑖) > 𝒕𝑒(𝑗)} 
𝐿(𝒕𝑞 , 𝑖) = {𝑗|𝒕𝑞(𝑖) > 𝒕𝑞(𝑗)} 
𝑄(𝑧) =  {
1 𝑧 > 0
0 𝑧 ≤ 0
 
The operational 𝑃𝑂 function can be reformulated as in eq. 
(9) [30]: 
𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃(𝒕
𝑒 , 𝒕𝑞) = 𝑃𝑂(𝒕𝑒 , 𝒕𝑞)  ≈
∑ (𝑅𝑖(𝒕
𝑒,𝒕𝑞)
𝑘−1
)𝑛−1𝑖=0
(𝑑
𝑘
)
 
(9) 
 
An interpretation of eq. (9) is as follows: the enumeration in 
which index i can be the max over a k-sized permuted window 
is given by the number of ways in which one can pick k-1 
entries that are smaller than the entry at i and common to both 
𝒕𝑒  and 𝒕𝑞, in which also indicate the collision probability of a 
pair of URP-based hashed codes [30]. This also validates the 
LSH property of URP realization. Similarly, the matching 
score is mere by counting the number of 0 after the element-
wise subtraction of 𝒕𝑒  and 𝒕𝑞 over m. 
F. Cancelable Template Generation 
In the event of template compromised, a IoM hashed code 
can be easily replaced with a new tokenized random 
permutation seed or tokenized Gaussian random matrices for 
URP or GRP, respectively. The effectiveness of the 
revocability is experimentally verified in section VII(D). In 
real world scenario, the random permutation seeds or random 
matrices are user-specific for revocability. However, stolen 
token/seed scenario should be focused as it is closely 
associated to accuracy performance, security and privacy 
attacks [5]. To evaluate the stolen-token scenario, our 
experiment is performed with same random token (i.e. random 
permutation seed or random matrices) for all subjects. The 
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accuracy performance in stolen-token scenario is presented in 
VI(B). 
G. Generic Template Protection 
The IoM hashing is generic in the sense that it can apply to 
most of the common biometrics in which their features are in 
binary form (e.g. iris, palmprint) and fixed-length vector form 
(e.g. face). Real-valued feature is directly applicable to the 
IoM hashing as demonstrated in this paper. A recent binary 
cancelable iris exposition, namely Index First One hashing 
(IFO) [39] is indeed a special case of the URP-based IoM 
hashing where the position of the first one in IFO is encoded 
in place of the position of maximum value in the URP-based 
IoM hashing. Attribute to the internal connection between IoM 
hashing and LSH, it is anticipated that the IoM hashing can be 
extended to other common biometric modalities. 
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this paper, we adopt fingerprint vector x with length 299 
outline in [29] as an input for IoM hashing evaluations. The 
evaluations are conducted on six public fingerprint datasets, 
FVC2002 (DB1, DB2, DB3) [40] and FVC2004 (DB1, DB2, 
DB3) [40]. Each dataset consists of 100 users with 8 samples 
per user. There are 800 (100×8) fingerprint images in total in 
each dataset. The performance accuracy of the proposed 
method is assessed with Equal Error Rate (EER) and the 
genuine-imposter distributions. Note that since the random 
permutation/projection is applied, the EERs are calculated by 
taking the average of EERs repeated for five times. 
For matching protocol, as described in [29], 1
st
 to 3
rd
 
samples of each identity are used as training samples to 
generate the fingerprint vector; the rest of the samples (i.e. 4
th
 
– 8th) of each identity are used in this experiment. There are 
500 (100×5) in total. Within this subset of data, the 
Fingerprint Verification Competition (FVC) [40] protocol is 
applied across the six data sets, which yields 1000 genuine 
matching scores and 4950 imposter matching scores for each 
data set.  
A. Parameters of IoM hashing 
1) Effect of window size k, Hadamard product order p, and 
number of hashing functions m 
For URP-based IoM, we first investigate the effect of 
window size k with respect to the performance in terms of 
EER. In this experiment, k is varied from 50, 80, 100, 128, 
156, 200 and 250 by fixing 𝑚 at 600. The identical setting is 
repeated for 𝑝 = [2,3,4,5]. Fig. 3 shows the curves of “EER 
(%)-vs-k” on FVC2002 (DB1, DB2) and FVC2004 (DB3). We 
can observe that:  
1) The EER drops gradually when larger k is applied and 
levels off when k becomes big. This is not a surprise as 
small k implies fewer comparisons and thus less 
informative of max ranked features.  
   
(a) (b) (c) 
Fig. 3 The curves of “EER (%) vs k” on FVC2002 and FVC2004 (DB1, DB2, DB3) 
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9 
2) The smaller p, the lower EER. As indicated in Algorithm 2 
(step 3), the Hadamard product, ?̅?(𝑗) = ∏ (?̂?𝑙(𝑗))
𝑝
𝑙=1  is 
essentially element-wise multiplication of p permuted 
vectors. Such an operation heightens the difficulty against 
inversion at the expense of introducing distortion in the 
product code due to the noises involved in one or multiple 
permuted vectors. Thus, it is expected that the performance 
drops with larger p. This also demonstrates the common 
trade-off suffered in the cancelable biometrics, namely 
performance-security trade-off.  
Apart from the above, we also examine the relation between 
the number of independent hashing functions m and EER. 
Evaluation has been carried out by increasing the m from 5, 
10, 50, 100, 300, 500, 800 and 1000 while fixing k=250, and 
p=2. As expected, a better EER can be attained with respect to 
the increment of m and level off at large m as illustrated in 
Fig. 4(a). Since randomization takes part in the hashing 
functions, the randomly permuted vectors constructed is 
approximately Gaussian distributed with sufficiently large m. 
Experimental evidence suggests that with m=200 and k=250, 
we obtain reasonably good performance accuracy. 
2) Effect of the number of Gaussian random matrices m, 
number of Gaussian random projection vectors 𝑞 
For GRP-based IoM, we investigate the effect of the 
number of Gaussian random matrices m and number of 
Gaussian random projection vectors 𝑞 with respect to the 
EER. In this experiment, m is changed from 2, 5, 10, 50, 100, 
150, 200, 250 and 300 while 𝑞 is varied from 2, 3, 5, 10, 50, 
100, 150, 200, 250 and 299. Then, Fig. 5 shows the curves of 
“EER (%)-vs-q” (curves display for m = 150, 200, 250 and 
300 only). We can observe: 
1. The 𝑞 plays an insignificant effect with respect to the EER. 
For instance, we earn EER=0.26% and EER=0.24% for 
𝑞 = 2 and 250, respectively where m is fixed to 300. This 
observation suggests that, with an adequate m, 𝑞 can be set 
small without compromising EER and can greatly save 
computational as well as storage cost. 
2. On the contrary, the number of Gaussian random matrices 
m is a significant factor to determine accuracy 
performance. The experiment in FVC2002 DB1 reveals 
that EERs are decreased dramatically from 27.82% to 
0.24% when m increases from 2 to 300 for 𝑞 =250. This 
observation remains true for other datasets as shown in 
Fig. 4(b). This confirms the theory of LSH, where points 
nearby are more likely to fall in the same bucket than the 
points farther away after hashing. The buckets 
(quantization) notion in LSH indeed resembles the GRP-
based IoM hashing in which the indices of the maximum 
value of projected vectors can be deemed as a quantization 
output. 
B. Accuracy Performance Evaluation 
In this section, the experiments of accuracy performance in 
stolen-token scenario using the best parameters tuned in the 
previous section are carried out for FVC2002 and FVC2004. 
Table II tabulates the accuracy results as well as comparisons 
with the baseline system and state of the arts. It can be 
observed that: 
1. The accuracy performance of the GRP-based IoM hashing 
is well preserved with respect to its original fingerprint 
vector counterpart [29] and MCC [12] regardless in stolen-
token and genuine-token cases. Furthermore, it can be 
observed that the accuracy difference between stolen-token 
and genuine-token cases is insignificant. This suggests a 
great advantage that the external token may not be a secret 
anymore; thus, the security and privacy attention on the 
secret requirement of the external token can be relaxed. 
The security and privacy analysis is provided in section 
VII. 
2. The GRP-based IoM hashing excels the existing minutiae 
based fingerprint cancelable templates [13] [15] [41] in 
TABLE II 
PERFORMANCE ACCURACY (AVERAGE EER %) AND COMPARISON 
Methods 
EER (%) for 
FVC2002 
EER (%) for 
FVC2004 
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB1 DB2 DB3 
Without Template Protection 
MCC [12] 0.60 0.59 3.91 3.97 5.22 3.82 
Fixed-length vector [29] 0.20 0.19 2.30 4.70 3.13 2.80 
With Template Protection 
URP-based IoM hashing 0.43 2.10 6.60 4.51 8.02 8.46 
URP-based IoM hashing 
 - genuine token 
0.20 0.88 1.94 0.44 3.08 2.91 
GRP-based IoM hashing 0.22 0.47 3.07 4.74 4.10 3.99 
GRP-based IoM hashing 
 - genuine token 
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2P-MCC64,64 [13] 3.3 1.8 7.8 6.3 - - 
Bloom Filter with fingerprint 
[41] 
2.3 1.8 6.6 13.4 8.1 9.7 
Random Projection-based Approach (Same token) 
Teoh et al. [16]  15 15 27 - - - 
Yang & Busch [7] - 2.65 - - - - 
Wang & Hu [15] 4 3 8.5 - - - 
 
 
 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
Fig. 5 The curves of “EER (%) vs q” on FVC2002 (DB1, DB2) and FVC2004 (DB3) 
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10 
terms of accuracy; this is attributed to the superior MCC 
descriptor and the nice property of performance 
preservation of fingerprint vector counterpart [29] and IoM 
hashing. 
3. The accuracy performance of the URP-based IoM hashing 
decreases gradually in FVC2002 (DB1 and DB2) and 
FVC2004 DB1 while remains approximately 3%-5% of 
deterioration in the rest of the testing sets. Such 
deterioration is expected as the discriminate features are 
likely to be permuted out of the k-window. However, the 
user-specific tokens of each user counteract the loss, thus, 
the accuracy in genuine-token scenario is comparable to its 
original vector counterpart [29] and MCC [12]. This 
suggests that the URP-based IoM hashing demands higher 
discriminative features in order to preserve accuracy. 
Nevertheless, the accuracy of URP-based IoM hashing is 
still comparable to the state-of-the-arts [13] [15] [41].  
C. Discussion of the time complexity & simple realization 
To investigate the time efficiency of the IoM hashing, we 
record both average code generation and matching time on a 
machine with specifications, such as Intel CPU i7-6700HQ 
(2.6GHz) and 8GB RAM. The timing readings are tabulated in 
Table IV. Note that MATLAB Ver. 2013b is used and code is 
not optimized. The computation time of the hashed code 
generation is longer than that of the matching due to a large 
number of independent hash functions (e.g. m=300, 600) are 
to be generated while matching takes much less time with the 
simple matcher described in Section V(E). Another 
observation is that the generation of GRP-based hashed code 
is much more efficient than that of the URP-based hashed 
code due to the larger number of permutation. Overall, the 
average matching time meets the expectation for an efficient 
matching requirement compared to light category
1 
in 
FVC2002 and FVC2004. We also remark that the 
implementation of IoM hashing is rather simple attributed to i) 
only random projection or random permutation is involved; ii) 
simple matching by mere element-wise subtraction and 
counting.  
VII. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
We devote this section for analysis beyond accuracy, 
namely (1) privacy analysis, (2) security analysis and (3) 
revocability/unlinkability analysis. Privacy analysis refers to 
the feasibility of a cancelable biometric scheme to withstand 
any attack to recover the original biometric data. Unlike 
 
1The light category is intended for algorithms conceived for light 
architectures and therefore characterized by low computation cost, in limited 
memory storage and small template size. 
privacy attack, security attack is meant to gain the illegitimate 
access, with feasible attack complexity to the biometric 
systems by means of the fake features (pre-image) or the 
elaborated instances that close to the genuine biometric data. 
As far as cancelable biometrics is concerned, privacy 
analysis includes non-invertibility and Attacks via Record 
Multiplicity (ARM) analysis while security analysis covers 
brute force analysis, ARM, false-accept analysis and birthday 
attack analysis. 
A. Privacy Analysis 
1) Non-invertibility Analysis 
Non-invertibility (irreversibility) refers to the computational 
hardness in restoring the fingerprint vector from the IoM 
hashed code with and/or without permutation seeds or random 
matrices that correspond to URP or GRP realizations, 
respectively. Here, we assume the adversary manages to 
retrieve the hashed codes, tokens and he knows well hashing 
algorithm as well as the corresponding parameters (e.g. m, k, 
p, q). For both URP-based and GRP-based IoM that expressed 
in the discrete indices form, there is no clue for an adversary 
to guess the fingerprint vector x information (real-value 
features) directly from the stolen hashed code alone. Besides, 
knowing the token (e.g. permutation seeds or projection 
matrices) is also helpless in recovering the fingerprint vector 
as no direct link exists between token and fingerprint vector. 
The way for the adversary to attack is only to guess the real-
value directly.  
In the worst case, assume that the adversary learns the 
minimum and maximum values of the feature components of 
x. Let’s take FVC2002 DB1 as an example, the minimum and 
maximum values of the feature components are -0.2504 and 
0.2132 respectively. Presume the adversary attempts to guess 
from -0.2504, -0.2503, -0.2502 and so on, until the maximum 
0.2132. There is a total of 4636 possibilities. In our 
implementation, the precision is fixed at four decimal digits, 
the possibility of guessing a single feature component of x 
TABLE III 
COMPLEXITY TO INVERT SINGLE AND ENTIRE FEATURE COMPONENT. 
Databases Min value with four 
decimal precision 
Max value with four 
decimal precision 
Possibilities for single 
feature component 
Total possibilities for 
entire feature 
FVC2002 DB1 -0.2504 0.2132 4636≈ 212 212×299 = 23588 
FVC2002 DB2 -0.2409 0.2484 4893≈ 212 212×299 = 23588 
FVC2002 DB3 -0.1919 0.2372 4291≈ 212 212×299 = 23588 
FVC2004 DB1 -0.2487 0.1748 4235≈ 212 212×299 = 23588 
FVC2004 DB2 -0.2357 0.1950 4307≈ 212 212×299 = 23588 
FVC2004 DB3 -0.1947 0.1796 3742≈ 211 212×299 = 23289 
 
TABLE IV 
AVERAGE TIME PROCESSED IN ENROLLMENT AND MATCHING STAGES 
IoM hashing 
Average Time 
(FVC2002) 
Average Time 
(FVC2004) 
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB1 DB2 DB3 
Enrollment Stage (generating hashed code, sec) 
 GRP-based IoM 
(q=16,m=300) 
0.0072 0.0075 0.0072 0.0072 0.0074 0.0070 
 URP-based IoM 
(k=250,m=600) 
0.0699 0.0884 0.0781 0.0829 0.0832 0.0793 
Matching Stage (matching hashed code, × 𝟏𝟎−𝟓 𝐬𝐞𝐜) 
GRP-based IoM  
(q=16,m=300) 
1.7238 1.6334 2.5238 2.2433 2.5394 1.6758 
URP-based IoM  
(k=250,m=600) 
1.8566 1.9421 2.1264 2.1549 1.9987 2.5874 
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11 
requires 4636 attempts (≈ 212). Thus, the entire 299 feature 
components require around 212×299 = 23588 attempts in total. 
The possibilities to correctly guess a single and entire feature 
component are presented in Table III. Obviously, this is 
computational infeasible. 
2) Attacks via Record Multiplicity (ARM) for Privacy 
Attacks via record multiplicity (ARM) is a more dreadful 
instance of privacy attack, which utilizes multiple 
compromised protected templates with or without knowledge 
and parameters that associated to the algorithm for original 
biometric reconstruction [42]. For IoM hashing, ARM is 
computationally hard to infer the numerical value as the stored 
templates have been transformed into the rank space that is 
uncorrelated to the fingerprint feature space. The attack 
complexity is thus identical to the non-invertibility attack 
presented in Table III. 
B. Security Attacks Analysis 
1) Brute-Force Attack 
Brute-force attack is an instance of security attacks. It is 
also known as pre-image attack or masquerade attack [5] in 
the literature. For URP realization, we take m=600 and k=128, 
which is the best accuracy configuration observed from 
section VI(A). Since the indices of IoM hashed code taking a 
value between 1 and 128. Hence, the guess complexity for 
each entry is 𝑘 = 128 = 27 and thus 600 entries requires 
24200 attempts, which are far beyond to be reached by the 
present computing facility. On the other hand, for GRP 
realization with m=300 and q= 64, the attack complexity for 
each entry is 𝑞 = 150 > 27, the complexity for 300 entries 
requires 22100 attempts that is again computational infeasible.  
Furthermore, we verify the above theoretical estimation 
empirically in sequel. In the experiment, we randomly 
generate a large number of hashed codes and perform 
illegitimate access. For each fingerprint vector, 1000 randomly 
hashed codes are generated and match against the fingerprint 
vector with identical permutation seeds or projection matrices. 
This results 500,000 (5×100×1000) matching scores in which 
we named brute-force attack scores. We plot the imposter and 
brute-force attack distribution as shown in Fig. 6. It can be 
observed that the brute-force attack distribution is either 
strongly overlapped or offset to the left with respect to the 
imposter distribution. This indicates that the brute-force attack 
scores lead to an equivalent dissimilarity with the imposter 
scores. This experimental result echoes the theoretical 
estimation above; thus, conclude the infeasibility of the brute-
force attack.  
2) Attacks via Record Multiplicity (ARM) for Security 
Unlike ARM for privacy, ARM is also a plausible security 
attack where multiple compromised protected templates with 
or without knowledge on the parameters that associated to the 
algorithm are utilized to generate a pre-image instance. In our 
case, if knowing the order of the feature components (not 
necessary the numerical value) and the permutation seeds, an 
elaborate faked feature vector can be formed. Consequently, 
the largest value resulted from the product of two permuted 
feature vectors appears in the desired position. The system can 
thus be broken.  
Now, the attack complexity of ARM can be perceived as the 
complexity of determining the order of the feature components 
in the fingerprint vector. For instance, for URP-based 
realization, let 𝐱 = {𝑥𝑎 ,  𝑥𝑏 ,  𝑥𝑐} be the input features, with 
𝑝 = 2 and two randomly permuted feature vectors ?̂?1 =
{𝑥𝑐 ,  𝑥𝑎 ,  𝑥𝑏} and ?̂?2 = {𝑥𝑏 ,  𝑥𝑐 ,  𝑥𝑎}. The Hadamard product 
vector ?̅? = {𝑥𝑏𝑥𝑐 , 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐 , 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑏} can be computed. Assume 
𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐 is the largest component, i.e. 
𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐 = max(∏ (?̂?𝑙(𝑗))
2
𝑙=1 )   𝑗 = 1,2,3, two inequalities can be 
derived as follows: 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐 > 𝑥𝑏𝑥𝑐  and 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐 > 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑏 . We can 
further reason that for 𝑥𝑎 > 𝑥𝑏  and 𝑥𝑐 > 𝑥𝑏, the adversary can 
retrieve the entire order information (e.g. 𝑥𝑎 > 𝑥𝑐 > 𝑥𝑏) by 
repeating this process with multiple hashed codes. However, 
in practice, our feature components contain both positive and 
negative values. For instance, let 𝐱 = {𝑥𝑎 ,  𝑥𝑏 ,  𝑥𝑐} = {-0.2, 
0.5, -0.1}, by using 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐 > 𝑥𝑏𝑥𝑐 , ie. (−0.2) × (−0.1) >
(0.5) × (−0.1), we obtain (−0.2) < (0.5), hence 𝑥𝑎 < 𝑥𝑏 . 
This is contradicted with 𝑥𝑎 > 𝑥𝑏. 
Such inequality reasoning is applicable to GRP-based 
realization as well attributed to the multiplication is a common 
ingredient for both Hadamard product in URP-based 
realization and the inner product (random projection) in GRP-
based realization. Therefore, ARM for IoM hashing is only 
valid if biometric feature values are either all negative or 
positive, the mixed sign in feature values renders inequality 
reasoning indefinite. We can conclude that the inequality 
relation is insufficient to launch ARM as a means of security 
attack. 
3) False Accept Attack 
Unlike blind guessing on the entire hashed code in brute 
force attack, false accept attack (dictionary attack) may 
requires far less number of attempts to gain illegitimate access 
[43]. In fact, this attack is viable due to the fact that 
thresholding-based decision scheme is commonly applied in 
biometric systems. In other words, access would be granted as 
long as the matching score succeeds the pre-defined threshold 
𝜏. Let we take the best performing parameters from the 
FVC2002DB1 experiments in section VI(A), i.e. m=600 and 
k=128, the decision threshold 𝜏 when FAR =FRR is observed 
is 0.11. Hence, the minimum number of matched (collided) 
entries in IoM hashed codes pair for successful access is 
𝜏 × 𝑚 = 0.11 × 600 = 66. The window size k indicates 128 
possible indices values that is equivalent to 27 (= 2log2 𝑘) 
guessing effort is required for an entry. Therefore, the false 
  
(a) URP-based IoM hashing in 
FVC2002 DB2 
(b) GRP-based IoM hashing in 
FVC2004 DB1 
Fig. 6 Imposter and brute-force attack distribution for brute-force attack 
analysis 
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12 
accept attack complexity can be estimated from (2log2 𝑘)𝜏×𝑚. 
For URP-based IoM hashing, we observed from TABLE V 
that the attack complexity reduced to 2462 compare to 24200 in 
brute force attack for FVC2002DB1 and the complexity 
reduction appears identical for the rest of testing data sets. 
However, we note that the reduced attack complexity is still 
favorably high to resist false accept attack.  
On the other hand, the attack complexity of GRP-based IoM 
hashing is more critical with carelessly selected parameters as 
evidenced in TABLE V. To escalate the attack difficulty, we 
can increase either m or 𝜏. Let 𝑚 = 1200 be set for FVC2004 
(DB1, DB2 and DB3), the attack complexity thus, reaches a 
level of computational infeasibility. Another option is to 
elevate 𝜏 by reducing the q as shown in TABLE V (FVC2002 
DB1, DB2 and DB3). This option is preferable than the former 
i.e. increasing m as it reduces the number of random Gaussian 
projection vectors. On the contrary, the former option requires 
more storage space for large m. 
4) Birthday Attack 
Apart from the above attacks, we present a new security 
attack for cancelable biometrics, namely Birthday attack [44]. 
Specifically, a birthday attack exploits the mathematics behind 
the birthday problem [44] in probability theory. The attack 
relies on the higher collision likelihood found between the 
random attacks and a fixed degree of permutations 
(pigeonholes). 
In our context, birthday attack refers to a scenario where an 
adversary has gained a large number of hashed codes from the 
compromised databases. This leads to a plausible security 
attack where at least a collision (match) can be found between 
any two hashed codes from 𝑁𝑡 hashed codes where 𝑁𝑡 >>1. 
For the hashed code with a single entry (𝑚 = 1), the expected 
trials of finding the first collision is 𝑄(𝛿) = √
𝜋
2
𝛿, where 𝛿 is 
the largest entry value of IoM hashed codes, i.e. 𝛿 = 𝑘 for 
URP and 𝛿 = 𝑞 for GRP. Suppose there is a collision of two 
hashed codes i.e. ℎ𝑖(𝑋) = ℎ𝑖(𝑌) where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 and 
ℎ(𝑋), ℎ(𝑌) ∈ [1, 𝛿]. The expected trials of finding the 
collisions for 𝜏𝑚 elements is (
𝛿𝜋
2
)
𝜏𝑚
2
. 
From TABLE VI, it can be observed that the complexity of 
birthday attack over the conventional false-accept attack is 
reduced approximately in square root degree. More 
importantly, the TABLE VI reminds us that attack difficulty is 
closely associated to the parameters selected. For instance, the 
complexity on FVC2004 DB3 is 2
35
 that are not ideally secure. 
Yet, we can further increase the complexity by either 
increasing m or reducing 𝜏 without compromising the 
performance accuracy. Concisely, a considerate justification is 
required to ensure the desired security level as well as 
performance criteria with proper parameters tuning.  
C. Non-linkability 
In this section, the requirement of non-linkability 
(unlinkability) is validated. To do this, we introduce the 
pseudo-genuine scores. The pseudo-genuine score refers to the 
matching scores between the hashed codes generated from 
different fingerprint templates of the same individual by using 
different permutation seeds or projection matrices. This 
protocol resembles the genuine matching protocol that yields 
1000 pseudo-genuine matching scores as well. Refer to section 
VII(D), the pseudo-imposter score is computed between two 
hashed codes generated from each template using different 
permutation seeds or projection matrices. In this context, when 
the pseudo-imposter and pseudo-genuine distribution are 
TABLE V 
FALSE ACCEPT ATTACK COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS FOR IOM HASHING. 
Databases 
URP-based IoM hashing GRP-based IoM hashing 
𝝉 m 𝝉 × 𝒎 k 
Minimum attack 
complexity  
𝝉 m 𝝉 × 𝒎 q 
Minimum attack 
complexity  
FVC2002 DB1 0.11 600 66 128 = 27 (27)66 = 2462 0.01(0.06) 300 3 (18) 16 = 24 212 (272) 
FVC2002 DB2 0.08 600 48 250 ≈ 28 (28)48 = 2384 0.01(0.06) 300 3 (18) 16 = 24 212 (272) 
FVC2002 DB3 0.05 600 30 250 ≈ 28 (28)30 = 2240 0.01(0.05) 300 3 (15) 16 = 24 212 (260) 
FVC2004 DB1 0.10 600 60 50 > 25 (25)60 = 2300 0.01 300 (1200) 3 (12) 150 > 27 221 (291) 
FVC2004 DB2 0.06 600 36 250 ≈ 28 (28)36 = 2288 0.01 300 (1200) 3 (12) 150 > 27 221 (291) 
FVC2004 DB3 0.06 400 24 250 ≈ 28 (28)24 = 2192 0.01 300 (1200) 3 (12) 150 > 27 221 (291) 
 
TABLE VI 
BIRTHDAY ATTACK COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS FOR IOM HASHING. 
Databases 
URP-based IoM hashing GRP-based IoM hashing 
𝝉 m  𝝉 × 𝒎 k expected trials: (
𝒌𝝅
𝟐
)
𝝉𝒎
𝟐
 𝝉 m  𝝉 × 𝒎 q expected trials: (
𝒒𝝅
𝟐
)
𝝉𝒎
𝟐
 
FVC2002 DB1 0.11 600 66 128 2252 0.06 
300 
66 
16 
242 
FVC2002 DB2 0.08 600 48 250 2207 0.06 48 242 
FVC2002 DB3 0.05 600 30 250 2130 0.05 30 235 
FVC2004 DB1 0.10 600 60 50 2189 0.10 60 270 
FVC2004 DB2 0.06 600 36 250 2156 0.06 36 242 
FVC2004 DB3 0.06 400 24 250 2104 0.05 24 235 
 
 
(a) URP-based IoM hashing in 
FVC2002 (DB1) 
 
(b) GRP-based IoM hashing in 
FVC2004 (DB2) 
Fig. 7 Pseudo-Genuine & Pseudo-Imposter distributions for non-linkability 
analysis. Overlapped distributions indicates indistinctiom of hashed codes that 
generated from the same user or from the others. 
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overlapped, it implies that the hashed codes generated from 
the same user or from the others are sufficiently indistinctive. 
On the contrary, if both distributions are far separated, this 
allows the adversary to differentiate the hashed code easily 
whether it is generated from the identical individual. The 
difficulty in differentiating the hashed codes contributed to the 
non-linkability or unlinkability property. Fig. 7 illustrates the 
pseudo-imposter and pseudo-genuine distribution plot where 
the pseudo-imposter and pseudo-genuine distribution are 
largely overlapped. This supports that the IoM hashed codes 
satisfy non-linkability or unlinkability property.  
D. Revocability 
In this section, revocability (renewability) is evaluated by 
conducting the experiments described in [45]. This produces 
100 × (5×100) = 50000 pseudo-imposter scores. The genuine, 
imposter and pseudo-imposter distributions are shown in Fig. 
8 where FVC2002 is used for URP-based IoM hashing while 
FVC2004 is tested for GRP-based IoM. From Fig. 8, it is 
observed that a large degree of overlapping occurs between 
the imposter and pseudo-imposter distributions. This implies 
the newly generated hashed codes with the given 100 random 
permutation sets and/or random projection matrices are 
distinctive even though it is generated from the identical 
source of fingerprint vector. In terms of verification 
performance, we obtain EER = 0.23%, 0.98%, 1.77% for 
URP-based IoM hashing in FVC2002 (DB1, DB2, DB3) and 
1.38%, 2.32%, 2.56% for GRP-based IoM hashing in 
FVC2004 (DB1, DB2, DB3) respectively in which 
intersection of genuine and pseudo-imposter distribution is 
taken. This verifies that the proposed both IoM realizations 
satisfies the revocability property requirement. We further 
note that the experiment presented in section VI(B) suggests 
that the stolen tokens (e.g. permutation seed or random 
matrices) would not compromise the accuracy performance 
significantly. Thus, tokens in IoM hashing merely serves for 
the revocability and are not secret for public.  
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
In this paper, we present a generic ranking based LSH 
motivated two-factor cancelable biometrics scheme dubbed 
IoM hashing. We demonstrate two realizations of the IoM 
hashing for fingerprint biometrics, namely URP-based and 
GRP-based IoM hashing. From both theoretical justification 
and empirical observations, the IoM hashed codes can largely 
preserve accuracy performance with respect to its before-
transformed counterparts thanks to the nice property of 
localized random projection and the rank correlation for GRP 
hashing and URP hashing, respectively. The IoM hashing is 
also shown satisfy both non-linkability and revocability 
template protection criteria. The IoM hashing is strongly 
resilient against the existing several major security and 
privacy attacks subject to the properly tuned parameters. 
Finally, we outline a new attack for cancelable biometrics 
namely birthday attack, which reveals even more dreadful than 
the dictionary attack (false accept attack). Our future work 
consists of four directions to further push the limits of the IoM 
hashing. The first direction is to extend the work to unordered 
variable-sized representation such as fingerprint minutiae. The 
second direction is to integrate with biometric cryptosystem 
primitives, e.g. Fuzzy Vault, Fuzzy Commitment, where 
secret-key vs privacy-leakage framework [46] could be 
incorporated for privacy preserving analysis. That would be a 
strong complement for cryptographic keys generation and 
protection purposes. Lastly, as a two-factor cancelable 
biometric scheme, the IoM hashing is naturally fitted to 
identity authentication scenario. However, it would be 
interesting to investigate the possibility of using IoM hashing 
in identification setting. 
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